Here's how we Can Better Use Airpower, Integrated with Limited numbers of Ground Forces, to Defeat ISIS in the Middle East

DEFEAT ISIS:  Massive Airpower Integrated with Limited US Ground Troops. (One Stryker Maneuver Brigade Combat Team)

Warfare in recent years has demonstrated how both land and air components can be used synergistically to produce dramatic effects on the battlefield. While ground maneuver can influence an enemy, either to push him away under threat of defeat, or to entice him to fight, this important capability becomes most effective when combined with an Air Maneuver Force, led by an Air Commander who orchestrates the sequencing of the campaign in concert with the supporting Ground Commander.



We don't think this way now in the military community nor in the White House - we think instead of a designated list of targets carefully vetted and approved at the highest levels for precise destruction, or maybe we destroy emerging targets quickly, but with very tight control.  Or we think of traditional Close Air Support for troops under fire.  This kind of stagnant thinking creates a false dichotomy, heard often from pundits on the news about Airpower vs Boots-on-the-Ground. 

We now are completely missing the synergistic effects of Air and Ground forces working together, led by thinking commanders, operating with mission type orders under decentralized execution - to destroy a fielded enemy we have intentionally manipulated to fight us on our terms. This enemy is a fielded force, dug in, holding territory in discrete areas of the desert.  We are good enough and we are strong enough and we can do better, but we choose not to.  Here's how we fix it:

 
Air Maneuver with Limited Ground Forces: Hammer Anvil Strategy

To push the enemy towards the
JFACC's desired engagement zone, the
coalition force should be of sufficient
strength to threaten the enemy.



Furthermore, the opponent should have a
clear channel towards the desired
engagement zone, allowing the enemy to
mass and become even more vulnerable to
airpower. During this kind of offensive
push, ground forces would serve as the
anvil, and the air maneuver force as the
hammer. As a traditional ground offensive,
this would differ from operations conducted
in the past because from the beginning,
forces intend to slow or shift their forward
movement at some point near the desired
engagement zone in order to allow Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) to
attrit the enemy. With troops avoiding close
contact as much as possible, the Air Commander
would then apply the BAO doctrine to attack
the massed enemy, without a need for
inefficient close coordination measures. If
circumstances inhibit the success of BAO,
then the supported role would shift quickly
to the land component, and air support
would provide traditional Close Air Support and
interdiction.

Air Maneuver with Limited Ground Forces: Enticement Strategy

Another method of enemy ground
force manipulation occurs through
enticement. Using carefully coordinated
maneuver, ground forces can bait an
enemy, drawing it towards the desired
engagement zone, while forcing it to
coalesce and mass in a way most
vulnerable to an air maneuver force. When
dispersed or entrenched units are
threatened by coalition surface maneuver,
they must either remain in place, vulnerable
to ground attack, or leave their locations en
masse to engage the attacking force and
thus present themselves to air attack. With
this knowledge, the Joint Force Commander could direct
operational surface maneuver in a way that
forces the opponent to combine from
dispersed positions or to commit his units
away from their  facilities. Forces may be drawn into the
Air Commander's desired engagement zone either
because they think they can win, or
because they want to avoid being caught in
a place where they cannot maneuver.

While at first look, this form of intentionally
attractive combat may seem less obvious or appealing
than traditional offensive maneuver, it has
actually occurred on several occasions
since 1990 with great results, and could
very well be the most effective method of
engaging troop concentrations embedded
within population centers. Although the
ultimate outcomes were largely
unintentional, surface units successfully
enticed enemy formations into vulnerable air
engagement zones in Operations Desert
Storm, Allied Force, and Iraqi Freedom. In
all cases, surface maneuver drew the
enemy into vulnerable positions, and then
using what amounted to Battlefield Air Operations, airpower
destroyed significant numbers of enemy
forces.

This paper essentially forms my portion of the book AirlandBattle21







Full Paper Below:


Warfare in recent years has demonstrated how both land and air components can be used synergistically to produce dramatic effects on the battlefield. While ground maneuver can influence an enemy, either to push him away under threat of defeat, or to entice him to fight, this important capability becomes most effective when combined with an Air Maneuver Force.  We don't think this way now in the military nor in the White House - we think instead of a designated list of targets carefully vetted and approved at the highest levels for precise destruction, or maybe we destroy emerging targets quickly, but with very tight control.  We miss the synergistic effects of Air and Ground forces working together, led by thinking commanders, operating with mission type orders under decentralized execution - to destroy an fielded enemy we have intentionally manipulated to fight us on our terms.

What has emerged is the ability for a joint commander to intentionally manipulate an enemy ground force into a zone vulnerable to massed, concentrated airpower. In the application of force against an army, an Air Force construct, Battlefield Air Operations, offers commanders a methodology that ushers in a new era for joint operational planning. Battlefield Air Operations capitalizes on lessons learned during operations in Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where enemy forces reacted to friendly ground presence, and were subsequently hammered by Airpower.

These operations have demonstrated that using Battlefield Air Operations in a campaign against fielded forces, the Commander may best achieve his operational objectives by designating the air component the main effort, supported by surface maneuver to drive or entice an enemy into a vulnerable air attack zone, then shift the supported role to the land component as troops move to close contact. Therefore, every effort should be made to incorporate this BAO concept into Air Force and joint doctrine and training, in order to enable the remarkable lessons of recent warfare to impact  future operations.


1. INTRODUCTION
On 26 March, 2003, during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, a column of between 70 and
120 Iraqi tanks, under the expected cover of
a heavy sandstorm, broke out of the city of
Basra towards the Faw Peninsula. Lured by
the presence of coalition ground forces
there, and with the intent to engage them in
surface warfare, this convoy of troops and
tanks streamed southeast, only to find
themselves suddenly targeted by a massive
assault from the air. Royal Air Force strike
aircraft appeared in the sky above,
pounding them with guns and precision
munitions in an attack that continued late
into the night, decimating the formation.1
Reminiscent of the deadly "highway of
death" air attack on the road from Kuwait
City to Basra twelve years earlier, this
·operation underscored the overwhelmingly
destructive power of air attack against an
enemy in the open. Even more importantly,
it demonstrated the synergy that occurs
when ground forces prompt an enemy to
maneuver into a position vulnerable to
airpower.

The Joint Force Commander (JFC)
did not intend for the enemy to maneuver as
it did, and coalition aircraft were not
preplanned or "on deck" in specific
preparation for this assault - the opportunity
presented itself to the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC), he acted
decisively, and the results were historic and
extraordinary. The most significant lessons
to be learned from this experience go
beyond an emphasis of airpower's flexibility
and destructive effects. The unplanned
outcomes provided by this and other
examples of modern warfare indicate that
campaign planners now have the
unprecedented ability to intentionally create
situations similar to those surrounding the
2003 Iraqi Basra convoy attack by using a combination of land and air maneuver
forces to deliberately manipulate and
destroy the enemy.

Operations since 1990 indicate that
maximum efficiency at the operational level
of war can be obtained through operational
maneuver using land forces to channel an
enemy into positions and concentrations
most vulnerable to air attack. What is
becoming more clear is that the effects
created by the joint employment of both air
and surface forces together is greater than
either could accomplish individually, and
that a JFC can expect dramatic results by
deliberately using his resources within this
construct.

To create the best circumstances for
a joint victory against an army, commanders
should ensure thorough and effective
operational planning to capitalize on the
complementary strengths of each
component. Fortunately, the Air Force's
newest doctrinal construct, Battlefield Air
Operations, offers the JFC a new way to
use airpower against an army, opening a
new era in joint warfare. In a campaign
against fielded forces, the JFC may best
achieve his objectives through Battlefield Air
Operations (BAO) by designating the air
component as the initial main effort,
supported by the land component to push or
lure an enemy into a desired engagement
zone, and then reassign the supported role
to the land component as surface forces
move to close contact. To sustain this
proposition, this paper will review the history
of BAO, and offer a methodology for
applying joint effects-based operations
against an army.

2. BATTLEFIELD AIR OPERATIONS
HISTORY: BAI TO BAO
BAO, the Air Force's newest doctrinal
idea, is a product of a long evolution of
airpower thought and experience. Between
the closing hours of Desert Storm, and the
opening shock of Iraqi Freedom, shrinking
defense budgets and legitimate differences
of opinion led land-centric and air-centric
warfighters down a contentious path, with
strongly-held viewpoints institutionally
polarizing the debate between both camps.2
At the extremes, advocates on each side
fueled a well-intentioned squabble over the
best ways to enhance the nation's warwinning
capability. Ground-centric
advocates decried the limitations of
airpower, echoing a "must-have-boots-onthe-
ground" mantra with an almost ,. . '
defensive zeal, while airpower zealots
occasionally oversold the benefits of
strategic air attack, sometimes overlooking
the validity of fielded forces as a strategic
target. As Terrance Mccaffrey observed,
"after Desert Storm, what Joint Force
commanders were missing was a
coordinated synergy of air and ground
combat effects that would enable them to
create the most overwhelming dilemma for
an enemy ."3 During this period, coalition
operations verified the unique ability of
friendly surface forces to compel enemy
reaction, and at the same time, highlighted
the maturing ability of airpower to apply
precise, destructive effects against an
enemy.

As a result of efforts to define the
proper use of airpower against a surface
threat, AFDD 2-1.3 in 1999 described
Counterland as a combination of Air
Interdiction and Close Air Support (CAS),
two traditional missions airmen have
performed since the early days of air
combat. 4 Subsequent successes during
operations against ground forces prompted
Air Force leaders to reexamine the way a
JFC can apply airpower on the battlefield.
Because of this, Air Doctrine with regard to
surface forces evolved from an early
understanding of Battlefield Air Interdiction
(BAI) which was based on the Army's
Airland Battle Doctrine of the 1980's, to a
more mature concept of BAO, which arose
from Air Force experiences during
Operations Allied Force and Enduring
Freedom, reaching fruition as a doctrinal
proposition in 2002, just before Operation
Iraqi Freedom.5

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) is a
term that originated in NATO in 1979, and
developed doctrinally for both the Army and
the Air Force through 1990. Both services'
doctrine in the mid eighties demonstrated a
common understanding of BAI, but for
several reasons, the term disappeared from .
doctrine after the first Gulf war.6 Prior to
Desert Storm, Army p-riorities focused on
targets beyond the front lines whose
destruction supported and facilitated the
friendly ground scheme of maneuver.
Similarly, BAI was significant to the Air
Force because it allowed aircrews to
engage targets between an established Fire
Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and the
line of friendly forces, without the
requirement to distribute control of small
packets of air~ower to lower-level ground
commanders. Because of this shared area
of interest, the BAI construct created a
battlefield zone which required extensive
coordination and cooperation, and in theory,
linked both services together in the targeting
of enemy forces located in the shallow
region beyond the line of friendly ground
forces.8 BAI differed from the CAS mission,
which required detailed, real-time
integration with ground controllers due to
the immediate proximity of friendly troops to
the intended targets. Original explanations
of BAI sprung from the Airland Battle
concept which was central to joint doctrine
in the 1980s, and focused on air operations
primarily with emphasis on the impact that
air could have on subsequent surface
operations.9 Key aspects of the debate
centered on coordinating air assets with
ground commanders between the forward
line of friendly ground forces and the FSCL,
to prevent the unintentional creation of a
doctrinal "no-mission zone."10

Unexpectedly, during the first Gulf
War, BAI missions were never included on
the Air Tasking Order, leading to an era of
doctrinal friction between the Army and the
Air Force.11 According to the Gulf War Air
Power Study (GWAPS), although Desert
Storm BAI missions could have been
assigned to targets on either side of the
FSCL, they were not. General Homer's
CONOPS for Command and Control (C2) of
tactical aircraft identified the "missions
inside the fire support coordination line [as]
CAS missions and all others outside the
line, Air Interdiction (Al) missions, which
deleted BAI as a type of mission."12

As the ground campaign drew closer,
the confusion created by this change made
it difficult for ground commanders to include
their priorities on the Air Tasking Order, and
established the FSCL as a barrier between
land and air control rather than a measure
to enhance coordination and create
synergy.13 The Army believed elimination of
BAI removed the system that allowed it to
influence the deep battle according to Army
doctrine.14

Air Force leaders, however, had a
completely different perspective, one which
was less focused on supporting ground
forces, and more intent on prosecuting an
overwhelming effects-based air war. "We
are not preparing the battlefield, we are
destroyin~ it," said then Lt Col Dave
Deptula.1 Air planners were intent on
destroying Iraqi fielded forces, but in a
timeline that differed from the Army's more
traditional notions of battlefield preparation.

During Desert Storm, the JFACC had
airpower to spare. Because ground forces
rarely engaged in close contact with the
enemy, he had an excess of available and
unassigned CAS sorties. Unfortunately,
elimination of BAI from the table prevented
the coalition from engaging some Iraqi
formations efficiently with these untasked
aircraft. To achieve their own objectives,
ground commanders sought to push the
FSCL as far forward as possible in order to
enhance their ability to affect the extended
battlefield, which then unintentionally
restricted aircraft designated for CAS
missions from engaging the enemy. The
CAS aircraft required extensive ground
coordination shy of the FSCL, but because
friendly forces were not in contact with the
enemy, the jets could not be targeted.16 As
GWAPS reported, "it is clear that there was
such an unintended zone in which Iraqi
forces benefited from the shortcomings of
Army/Air Force coordination."17 Each
service, struggling to optimize its own
contribution to the joint fight in the shallow
zone forward of friendly troops, actually
mitigated the combat effects of both
services, resulting in missed opportunities
on the battlefield. Despite the shortcomings
created by different doctrinal viewpoints,
this fundamental gap in the US joint
warfighting construct persisted through
Operation Enduring Freedom, and into the
days immediately prior to the second Gulf
War.

Many believe a fundamental reason
for this joint coordination problem was the
existence of a doctrinal gap between CAS
and interdiction. Indeed, in order to cover
targets that fell neither into the interdiction
nor the CAS categories, air planners in
several theaters began to direct "killbox"
operations to destroy moving enemy forces
within given map grids real-time,
independent of friendly ground forces.
Building on this concept to remedy to the
doctrinal gap, Maj General David A. Deptula
strongly supported a concept very similar to
BAI, but one which was fundamentally
different: his construct was not a support
mission for the ground scheme of
maneuver. Instead, it capitalized on
dramatic advances in sensor capability, C2,
and precision engagement, and applied
powerful air assets against enemy fielded
forces on the battlefield to achieve victory
without the need to expose friendly ground
forces to the destructive effects of the
enemy. "I believe that there is a doctrinal
void that needs to be filled and my
proposition for filling it is battlefield air
operations."18 Emphasizing his point after
returning from Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in 2002, Maj Gen Deptula
reported, "I think we're doing battlefield air
operations, we're just calling it something
else ... right now we're calling it CAS, and it's
not CAS.19

Attempting to clearly define BAO
while exploring this idea in 2002, Col Gary
Crowder at the US Air Force's Air Combat
Command (ACC), and others at the Air
Force Doctrine Center led the development
of a proposal that reflected the new
construct. BAO was defined as "Air
Operations conducted in a supported role
against an enemy land force with the intent
to destroy or neutralize them. '120 This
proposal sought to fill a doctrinal gap
between the traditional Al and CAS
missions, and was intended to describe air
attack against surface forces in situations
when friendly troops are absent, or where
their proximity to adversary ground does not
require detailed integration of CAS.21
The emergence of the BAO mission
construct offered a solution for nagging
problems in both the Air Force and the
Army. BAO meant the Air Force could stop
misusing the terms CAS and Al, which
occurred during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM, and allowed the Army to apply
recent changes in its deep battle doctrine
and organization to benefit from the new
idea.22 Applying this idea in Iraq in 2003,
planners divided Iraq into a grid of kill
boxes, directing swarms of airpower against
those containing Republican Guard units.
In name, this mission was identified as
"Kl/CAS, for 'kill box interdiction close air
support."23 In truth, it was BAO.

· Today, in the aftermath of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the BAO proposal offers
unprecedented options to the JFC. As
valuable as BAO can be in the execution of
missions without the presence of friendly
ground forces, its greatest promise may
actually lie in the way it can facilitate joint
warfare planning to maximize the
destructive effects of both ground and air
power and serve as the catalyst for a new
form of joint synergisti('. campaign planning.
Using BAO, a JFC can intentionally
manipulate the enemy by using friendly
ground maneuver, and then apply an air
maneuver force (precision airpower,
massed and concentrated against fielded
forces) to achieve remarkable effects on the
battlefield. Rather than using air in the
traditional construct of supporting the boots
on the ground, he can use those boots to
prime the battlefield, shaping the enemy
order of battle into a configuration
vulnerable to air attack. Used in this way,
BAO could serve as the linchpin of a joint
campaign.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TARGETING
FIELDED FORCES
Recent operations during Operation
Iraqi Freedom highlight the importance of
attacking fielded forces to achieve
operational objectives. Although other
target sets such as counterair, political
targets, and information nodes are crucial to
success in joint operations, troops and
vehicles on the ground have historically
· been and will likely remain an important
center of gravity in any future operation.
When coercion is the primary goal of
warfare, success can be best achieved
through a denial strategy directed against
key military vulnerabilities to undermine the
enemy's capability to exert control of
territory.24

As a mission specifically
designed to achieve effects against enemy
surface forces, BAO offers a powerful
construct for achieving this mission. In his
book Bombing to Win, Robert Pape explains
that "using air power for denial entails
smashing enemy military forces, weakening
them to the point where friendly ground
forces can seize disputed territories without
suffering unacceptable losses."25 From a
joint view, BAO represents the ultimate in
this brand of coercive denial: A JFC can
use airpower to significantly attrit enemy
fielded forces prior to land force
engagement, as General Franks directed
against the Republican Guard south of
Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom.26
This does not minimize in any way
the crucial importance of strategic attack in
accomplishing JFC objectives. Operations
against fielded forces may actually
strengthen the JFC's ability to conduct the
strategic attack mission. Operations during
Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Iraqi
Freedom demonstrated the disproportionate
effects air strikes achieve when the JFC
views the enemy as a system. Despite the
importance of strategic targeting during
campaign planning, the existence of enemy
fielded forces can threaten friendly systems,
or help protect vulnerable enemy ones. In
fact, Col John Warden, author of the original
concept for the Desert Storm air operation,
contends that although fielded forces are
only a means to a strategic end, they may
well remain a key target set because their
destruction may open other enemy strategic
centers to destruction from joint forces. The
degree of required destruction would spring
from the level of importance the enemy
places on his forces or his ability to threaten
friendly assets. 27

The sheer number of men and
equipment that exists globally within
potentially threatening countries indicates
the validity of viewing fielded forces as a
significant center of gravity. Retired Army
General Barry McCaffrey counts "seven
countries as potential combatant threats to
the United States in the next 15
years ... [with] a current force structure of
more than 5 million active and reserve
troops, 16,000 main battle tanks, and
13,000 armored infantry fighting vehicles."28
Gen Richard Hawley, (USAF Ret) echoes
the importance of planning for a campaign
against fielded forces. "While it is unlikely
that the US will be required to fight a major
land war in the Asia Pacific region, outside
of Korea, it would be unwise to completely .
write off that potential."29 Korea's formidable
army is poised for action amid a tumultuous
political environment that makes the
prospect of war in that theater increasingly
troublesome. Regardless of where
America's next war takes place, enemy
fielded forces will play a key role in
campaign planning, and the JFC's ability to
conduct effective joint, synergistic
counterland operations will help determine
the outcome of the operation.

3. JOINT EFFECTS-BASED
OPERATIONS AGAINST AN ARMY
In order to achieve campaign objectives
against fielded forces, all components must
carefully coordinate synergistic Effects
Based Operations (EBO) to achieve the
JFC's intent. An effects-centric approach
no longer counts the numbers of troops or
vehicles destroyed, but the operational
results achieved through the synergistic
combination of all elements of the force. 30
EBO is a fundamental aspect of today's joint
paradigm, and will play a crucial role in joint
warfare against a fielded enemy. In the
case of an enemy surface force, the JFC's
desired operational effects will likely be to
render that enemy combat ineffective in the
quickest, most efficient way. In the pursuit
of this goal, the JFC can direct integrated
teams of air and surface forces in dynamic
ways to impose an operational dilemma
upon the ·enemy: either he can remain in
place and become vulnerable to a joint
offensive, or move, exposing his forces to
air attack. 31

The combat planner's key to a
successful strategy will be to force a
reactive posture that affords the JFC his
greatest asymmetric advantage. This kind
of joint warfighting will exploit joint
maneuver, human factors, and achieve a
unique synergistic effect by employing air .
and land maneuver in concert to produce
effects disproportionate to the expended
effort.32 The Air Force's counterland
doctrine publication, AFDD 2-1.3,
emphasizes airpower's ability to either act in
support of friendly surface operations, or as
the main effort against enemy fielded forces
to achieve these effects. 33 Furthermore, it
stresses the importance of using friendly
surface maneuver in concert with air
operations to make the enemy more
vulnerable to joint forces.34

From a surface
commander's point of view, the most
significant recognition of this construct
appears in the 2001 FM 3-0, Operations. It
concedes, "Army forces may be the
supporting force during certain phases of
the campaign and become the supported
.force in other phases."35 The significance of
these two documents underscores a joint
recognition of the need to coordinate
actions across the battlespace to maximize
destructive effects against enemy fielded
forces.

When the JFC directs ground maneuver
forces either to push or to entice enemy
movement, he uses that presence to
expose the reacting enemy. As the enemy
force masses or moves in an attempt to
create advantages against friendly surface
forces, it presents vulnerable targets for
precision engagement from the air.36 The
result is that the maneuvering land force
commander can intentionally delay active
engagement until enemy fielded forces are
dramatically weakened by the air maneuver
force.

The JFC can then direct surface
forces to engage at the right time and place
to capitalize on this effect. Using this
principle during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
land commanders delayed forward
movement between 29 March and 3 April
2003, as coalition airpower pounded
elements of the Republican Guard
defending Baghdad and slashed enemy
force structure in a phenomenal rout of
fielded forces prior to friendly surface
engagement. According to U.S. News and
World Report, "like the Baghdad Division,
the Medina Division had been judged
'combat ineffective' by the Pentagonmeaning
that airstrikes had reduced the
unit's combat power by at least 50
percent."37 When the land component
moved forward, advancing US troops
continued to destroy the remaining
Republican Guard forces.

To maximize battlefield effects, the JFC
must optimize his capability to use
traditional surface maneuver forces in
conjunction with an air maneuver force to
achieve synergistic gains. Martin Van
Creveld defines seven central elements that
help to define the art of maneuver. Tempo,
surprise, flexibility, decentralized execution,
mission type orders, combined arms, and
schwerpunkt, (the ability to hit pivotal,
vulnerable targets) all represent
fundamental essentials of traditional
maneuver warfare.38 "Maneuver seeks to
avoid both the battlefield and the bloodshed
by moving to the next highest operational
level; in other words, it seeks to decide the
tactical engagement by using grand tactics,
the grand tactical engagement by using
operational art, and the operational-sized
engagement by resorting to strategy."39
Before a fight takes place, a maneuver force
seeks to place the enemy at a disadvantage
by moving to a position that maximizes
friendly strengths, in an attempt to achieve
ultimate victory while engaging in the
minimum amount of combat.4

Traditionally,
maneuver warfare has been a limited, two dimensional
paradigm with an emphasis on
the ground scheme of maneuver. Army
Field Manual 3-0, however, describes
Maneuver Warfare in a way that opens new
possibilities for joint operations. "Maneuver
implies more than the use of fire and
movement to secure an objective; it aims at
the complete overthrow of the enemy's
operational design. It requires audacious
concepts and ruthless execution."41
Maneuver is no longer just about seizing
ground- it is about achieving desired joint
effects through bold, inventive plans. 2
USING AIR AS A MANEUVER FORCE
In a joint operation against a fielded
enemy, the Air Component can actually
perform as a maneuver force in line with
these classic Army definitions, applying
massed and concentrated firepower against
exposed forces from the third dimension.
New technology recently developed and
fielded, allows air component C2 to mass
and concentrate overwhelming airpower at
a specific time and place against an
enemy's surface-limited forces. Doctrinally,
airmen have long advocated the capability
to employ rapid maneuver from the air
against critical fielded forces43, but
technology, force structure, and advances in
C2 capability have converged to make this
once-abstract theory a realistic expectation.

In future joint operations at the operational
level of war, the functions and effects both
land and air instruments of power can
achieve against a fielded enemy will remain
quite comparable, due to their similarly
destructive capabilities.44 Both components
have limitations, however, which strengthen
the case for coordinated joint maneuver.
Just as aircraft cannot occupy territory,
surface units do not possess airpower's
inherently capacity to take advantage of the
powerful potential afforded by occupation of
the battlespace over the enemy.45 Although
an air maneuver force has the limitation of
not being able to hold ground, its unique
targeting perspective affords an advantage
that forms the essence of maneuver
warfare. As General Alfred M. Gray, former
Marine Corps Commandant instructed,
"warfare by maneuver stems from· a desire
to circumvent a problem and attack it from a
position of advantage rather than meet it
straight on."46

This concept of an air maneuver
force opens a new way of viewing joint
warfare. Not only can ground maneuver
forces reposition to gain relative advantages
over the enemy, but an air maneuver force
can be planned, marshaled, and
concentrated on the battlefield, in concert
with manipulative ground forces, at the
precise time and place to achieve
overwhelming victory. The benefit of
utilizing an air maneuver force to achieve
these effects is efficiency. After air
superiority is gained, a JFC will place fewer
American lives at risk, and yet obtain the
same outcome in the field by applying an air
maneuver force to an exposed enemy
rather than initially engaging with troops or
armor. Using the full extent of his
battlespace, the joint planner is thus able to
exploit all of the available maneuver room to
full advantage. Planners can consider not
only the horizontal flanks of a two dimensional
battlefield, but the third dimensional
"vertical flank" enabled by a
coordinated air maneuver force.47
Many traditionalists may discount
airpower's ability to serve as a maneuver
force because it cannot hold ground. From
a surface-centric point of view, the ability to
maintain battlefield presence may indeed
serve as a key element of victory -- in some
cases. Maneuver warfare, however, is most
often about effects, not territory. In fact, a
requirement for maneuver forces to hold
ground could actually serve as a limitation,
rather than a strength. When air superiority
is achieved, and an air maneuver .force
executes persistent precision operations
against fielded targets, it achieves similar
effects as a land maneuver force, yet
remains free of the constraints imposed by
terrain and logistics.

Operators are free to
engage targets well beyond surface line-ofsight
limitations and their effects can be
·quickly shifted and massed at any point on
the battlefield which will impart the greatest
destructive impact upon the enemy. An air
maneuver force attack, centrally controlled
and decentrally executed, can exact swift
and overwhelming effects on an enemy
fielded force in a way unavailable to ground
forces.

USING SURFACE FORCES TO
MANIPULATE AN ENEMY

General Charles Krulak, former
Commandant of the Marine Corps remarked
during his tenure that, "in the past, the goal
was to use firepower to allow the infantry to
close with and destroy the enemy with direct
combat. Now we're thinking more of using
maneuver not to close with an enemy ... but
to bring long-range fires on him. Maneuver
will have more to do with staying away from
the enemy than closing with him."48 During
operations in which these fires can be best
delivered by airpower, ground maneuver
forces will play a crucial role in bringing the
enemy into the air maneuver force's desired
engagement zone. In order to target enemy
ground forces most effectively, joint
planners should employ land maneuver
forces to manipulate and fix the enemy for
precision air attack immediately prior to
close ground combat.

Because of surface maneuver's
unique capability to influence an enemy,
joint planners can use this strength to
capitalize on the asymmetric advantage
offered by BAO. According to FM 3-0,
"maneuver creates and exposes enemy
vulnerabilities to the massed effects of
friendly combat power."49 Commanders
who creatively employ ground forces to
expose the enemy to air attack will achieve
a synergy that efficiently defeats a fielded
force.

Experiences in Kosovo during
Operation Allied Force highlighted the
importance of using a ground presence to
keep the enemy reactive. Airpower
commentator Benjamin Lambeth asserts,
"although Allied Force reconfirmed that
friendly ground forces need no longer be
inexorably committed to combat early, it
also reconfirmed that airpower often cannot
perform to its potential without a credible
ground component in the campaign
strategy."50 Without the presence of an
influential ground presence, enemy forces in
Kosovo were able to disperse, conceal
themselves, or shelter next to buildings,
making air attack more difficult through
passive measures. If used by the JFC, a
threatening or enticing ground force
presence may have provided the motivation
for the Serb army to mass sooner and more
frequently, forming a lucrative target for an
air maneuver force. In Afghanistan, this
lesson was used to great advantage. As
US Army Col John Antal remarked, "We
saw the power of a truly joint air-ground
attack. A single form of attack ... would not
have been as effective."51

Although political constraints
prevented the JFC from using ground forces
this way in Kosovo, existing doctrine
strongly supports using air and ground
forces together in a synergistic hammer and
anvil strategy to defeat an enemy fielded
force. According to Army doctrine,
operational firepower "is by its nature
primarily a joint/multinational activity or
task,"52 and can be used to "destroy,
suppress, or neutralize enemy operational
targets."53 Army Field Manual 3-0 outlines
fundamental characteristics of maneuver
warfare in support of decisive operations,
uncovering the role that friendly ground
maneuver units can play in the achievement
of decisive attack by airborne platforms.
Army doctrine describes decisive operations
as " ... attacks that conclusively determine
the outcome of major operations, battles,
and engagements."54 To achieve quick
victory, joint planners strive to create a
condition of "overmatch," or an
overwhelming qualitative disparity, by
synchronizing capabilities at decisive
points.55 In order to generate this
overmatch, commanders may employ
shaping operations to " ... create conditions
for success of the decisive operation" by
exposing or creating vulnerabilities for
exploitation. 56

Doctrinally, shaping operations may
be designed to deceive the enemy, fix
forces, or to force them to commit,57 and
these shaping operations involve the use of
maneuver forces to achieve desired effects.
For example, in support of decisive
operations, a commander could fix an
enemy force with a shaping operation as
other forces envelop it in an attack against a
decisive point.58 Specifically, Army Field
Manual 3-0 states that commanders may
direct a frontal attack (one form of
maneuver warfare) as a shaping operation
and another form of maneuver as the
decisive operation. 59 When the joint
commander uses ground maneuver forces
to shape, but chooses to envelop with an air
maneuver force, he may achieve
remarkably decisive results from the air well
before the ground shaping force is required
to engage an enemy in a close fight.

When
airpower is applied as a maneuver force,
these Army doctrinal concepts enable a
commander to plan boldly to achieve
decisive objectives while sustaining minimal
casualties.

When the JFC intentionally applies
operational ground maneuver to channel the
enemy into an air maneuver force's desired
engagement zone, he optimizes joint
effects. To prepare for this type of joint
operation, the JFACC, in coordination with
the JFLCC, first determines the location of
the optimum desired engagement zone
based on terrain, order of battle, and
subsequent objectives. Then, the enemy's .
position relative to coalition maneuver units
will determine whether the land component
should push or pull enemy forces towards
that zone.

HAMMER & ANVIL STRATEGY -
MANIPULATING WITH GROUND
MANEUVER

To push the enemy towards the
JFACC's desired engagement zone, the
coalition force should be of sufficient
strength to threaten the enemy.

Furthermore, the opponent should have a
clear channel towards the desired
engagement zone, allowing the enemy to
mass and become even more vulnerable to
airpower. During this kind of offensive
push, ground forces would serve as the
anvil, and the air maneuver force as the
hammer. As a traditional ground offensive,
this would differ from operations conducted
in the past because from the beginning,
forces intend to slow or shift their forward
movement at some point near the desired
engagement zone in order to allow BAO to
attrit the enemy. With troops avoiding close
contact as much as possible, the JFACC
would then apply the BAO doctrine to attack
the massed enemy, without a need for
inefficient close coordination measures. If
circumstances inhibit the success of BAO,
then the supported role would shift quickly
to the land component, and air support
would provide traditional CAS and
interdiction.

Afghanistan - Operation ANACONDA
Validates Hammer & Anvil Strategy
During Enduring Freedom's OPERATION ANACONDA, Army planners
applied this strategy in a limited way,
intending to use Afghan troops as the anvil
to push al Qaeda forces towards objective
Remington and a waiting hammer of Army
forces. 60 Although Anaconda did not go
exactly as planned, the strategy was sound
in that enemy forces reacted in a
predictable way to ground maneuver
elements. Unfortunately, what Anaconda's
planners missed was an opportunity to
deliberately plan usin~ an air maneuver
force as the hammer.

In February 2002, coalition planners
monitoring satellite and unmanned aerial
vehicle sensors noted several hundred al
Qaeda forces as they transformed from a
retreating gaggle on the run, into a
concentrated mass of troops near Shah-eKot,
in the mountainous region of eastern
Afghanistan.62 Taking stock of these fielded
forces, CENTCOM initiated a plan to use
Afghan forces in the north to push the
enemy towards waiting US forces who
would encircle the enemy and block al
Qaeda escape routes. This was a classic
light infantry tactic, and from the outset,
Operation ANACONDA was predominantly
an Army plan.63

During the days preceding
ANACONDA, planners wisely chose to use
ground maneuver forces to encircle and
manipulate Al Qaeda into positions
vulnerable to the combined force but
regrettably, they failed to integrate the air
component into the planning effort until very
late in the process. Intending to achieve
principal effects using troops on the ground,
the joint planning team relegated integrating
air assets in Anaconda to a low priority,
assuming that close air support aircraft
would be available when needed, as a last
resort.64 In fact, one air planner reported
that personnel in the air operations center
became aware of the effort only a day prior
to its execution. As Rebecca Grant
reported, "the emerging plan for Anaconda
had all the earmarks of an operation
planned almost exclusively within the Army
Component and special forces ... the plan for
Anaconda had not been fully coordinated
with the joint air component."65

The plan for Anaconda, and the
reason for its name, was to use American
and coalition soldiers to squeeze the enemy
from all sides of a 60 square-mile-area as
soldiers located, fixed, and destroyed the
enemy in rugged, mountainous terrain. In
the middle of the area was Objective
Remington, a central zone towards which all
planned assaults would drive.66 Army
planners intended for several different
ground units, including Afghan coalition
fighters, to either herd the al Qaeda forces
towards vulnerable zones for engagement,
or block them from escaping. Although the
plan to manipulate and herd the enemy was
sound, during execution, the performance of
the Afghan troops on which it hinged was
worse than expected. 67

Responding to the developing fight,
the coalition air operations center quickly
directed a surge of airpower to the area,
stacking assets in the airspace over the
relatively small surface area in a queue to
provide CAS and what amounted to BAO to
an engagement zone the size of the District
of Columbia.68 As the land component
pinned enemy fielded forces, attack
helicopters and air component assets
delivered precise air strikes, inflicting heavy
damage on al Qaeda. 69 The battle
subsequently enticed even more enemy
forces towards the fight, with devastating
consequences: Two A-10 pilots were
credited with more than 200 dead al Qaeda
and Taliban forces.70 Bombers, fighters, and
gunships all contributed to a successful joint
fight.

Although the outcome was
acceptable, the preparation effort leading
into the joint operation provided all services
a great lesson in joint campaign planning.
During the days preceding Anaconda,
planners' reliance on last-minute CAS,
rather than detailed prior planning ultimately
forced airmen to react to enemy movements
while friendly units were in contact, rather
than proactively engage troops on better
terms. Ground planners' fundamental
misperceptions of the air targeting process
caused them to limit airpower application to
fixed targets or CAS, missing the inherent
flexibility offered by adequate numbers of
pre-planned laser-equipped strike aircraft
on-call for precision BAO against moving,
fleeting targets. Anaconda represents a
missed opportunity for joint campaign
planning.

The "Highway Of Death" Highlights
Synergy of Land and Air Effects
Years earlier, during Desert Storm,
coalition planners inadvertently used a
hammer and anvil operation to create a
successful outcome when Marines
threatened to enter Kuwait City from the
south, sending thousands of Iraqi troops in
a massive retreat north towards the city of
Basra. As forces afloat used decoy
maneuvers to deceive defenders along the
coast, the 1st Marine Division battled Iraqi
ground forces in southern Kuwait around
the raging inferno of the Burqan oil fields.
Despite a spirited Iraqi counter-attack, the
1st Division succeeded in overwhelming
these enemy forces south of Kuwait City.
This battle delayed a planned Marine
advance into the city to face the occupying
force; nevertheless, the very presence of
the ground maneuver force was sufficient to
drive the enemy north. In the evening
immediately after the fighting at the Burqan
oil fields, seismic sensors detected largescale
Iraqi troop movements, retreating out
of Kuwait City, towards Basra. What
followed was one of the most destructive air
attacks on a fielded force in history, as
commanders dispatched F-1 SE aircrews to
attack the moving column of vehicles in the
dark, instructing them to stop the escaping
convoy.71 The airmen !JSed infrared
systems to target the lead vehicles in the
convoy, halting the convoy in the desert at
Mutlah Ridge. Air Force and Navy aircraft
continued the attack through the night,
destro~ing 1400 stolen vehicles and 28 Iraqi
tanks. 2 Coalition planners inadvertently
used a formidable ground maneuver force
to influence the enemy to move and mass in
a way that made it vulnerable to air attack in
the form of what essentially was BAO.
Because of this, the Iraqi army found itself
on the horns of the classic dilemma
imposed by effective joint planning: stay in
place and face an overwhelming ground
force, or move and risk devastating air
attack. Either choice, made in the vise of
applied joint synergy, would have been a
poor one.

ENTICEMENT STRATEGY

Another method of enemy ground
force manipulation occurs through
enticement. Using carefully coordinated
maneuver, ground forces can bait an
enemy, drawing it towards the desired
· engagement zone, while forcing it to
coalesce and mass in a way most
vulnerable to an air maneuver force. When
dispersed or entrenched units are
threatened by coalition surface maneuver,
they must either remain in place, vulnerable
to ground attack, or leave their shelters en
masse to engage the attacking force and
thus present themselves to air attack. With
this knowledge, the JFC could direct
operational surface maneuver in a way that
forces the opponent to combine from
dispersed positions or to commit his units
away from their protected underground
facilities. Forces may be drawn into the
JFACC's desired engagement zone either
because they think they can win, or
because they want to avoid being caught in
a cave.

While at first look, this form of
attractive combat may seem less appealing
than traditional offensive maneuver, it has
actually occurred on several occasions
since 1990 with great results, and could
very well be the most effective method of
engaging troop concentrations hidden deep
within underground facilities. Although the
ultimate outcomes were largely
unintentional, surface units successfully
enticed enemy formations into vulnerable air
engagement zones in Operations Desert
Storm, Allied Force, and Iraqi Freedom. In
all cases, surface maneuver drew the
enemy into vulnerable positions, and then
using what amounted to BAO, airpower
destroyed significant numbers of enemy
forces.

Desert Storm - Marine Decoy Fixes Iraqi
Forces in Place

During the first Gulf war, General
Schwarzkopf s decision to utilize a Marine
Amphibious Force in a decoy role served to
fix enemy fielded forces into positions
vulnerable to attack along the coast. With
the overall intention of weakening Iraqi
ground forces prior to the allied ground
assault, he directed Marines along the coast
to practice amphibious operations to focus
Iraqi attention towards the perceived threat
from the beach. As Gen Schwartzkopf
reported during "The Mother of all
Briefings", the allies then attacked the Iraqi
fortified positions from the air as they were
held in place.73 Although many defenders
had already been routed by the time several
Marine helicopter feints were executed, the
Iraqis clearly anticipated an attack on the
Kuwaiti coast and reacted accordingly.74
Marine ground maneuver divisions
subsequently pinned them against the
coast. The Marines afloat never engaged
these forces, but manipulated them through
decoy maneuver, fixing them in place.
Although in this case, airpower wasn't used
against these forces to the same decisive
extent it was in other segments of Desert
Storm, this successful decoy operation
highlights the ability of a perceived ground
maneuver force to generate a desired
response from enemy fielded forces.

Desert Storm - Coalition Units Entice
Iraqi Forces into Air Engagement Zone

Earlier in the first Gulf War, The
Battle of Khafji, as much as any other
engagement in history, demonstrated the
unique ability of centrally controlled
airpower to flexibly target enemy fielded
forces as they are enticed into combat by
friendly ground units. On January 29, 1991,
Saddam Hussein directed a ground assault
on the Saudi coastal town of Al Khafji. His
apparent goal was to engage a joint force
deployed along the coast, presumably to
force an American ground battle that would
produce casualties numerous enough to
affect the political climate in America.75
The raid was intended to enable Iraqi troops
to capture coalition personnel.76 When
reinforcing armored columns began to
coalesce in Kuwait to support the initial
Khafji invaders, JSTARS airborne sensors
detected the vehicles, and coalition fighter
aircraft were immediately diverted to target
mobile targets in these columns. Lt Gen
Horner, the JFACC, then retargeted more
than 140 jets against the Iraqi 3rd Armored
and 5th Mechanized divisions, destroying
the movini ground forces with deadly
precision. Aircraft quickly destroyed more
than 350 tanks, 147 armored personnel
carriers, and 89 artillery pieces. This was
Iraq's last offensive ground operation. With
overwhelming force, airpower prevented
Iraqi reserves from reaching Khafji, inflictin~
heavy damage and forcing a hasty retreat.
According to Gordon and Trainor, an Iraqi
officer reported his unit experienced more
destruction by US airpower in fifteen
minutes than eight years during the Iran
war.79

Although coalition troops were not
intentionally positioned to channel Iraqi
movement towards them, their presence
caused the enemy to mass and move in a
way that was vulnerable to airpower. When
the battle was over, the inadvertent synergy
created between tempting ground presence
and deadly airpower had defeated the
enemy.

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) Entices
Serbs Into Vulnerable ·Positions

In 1999 during Operation Allied
Force, Airpower demonstrated an
unprecedented capability to achieve
tangible results, despite a number of
political constraints imposed by the Clinton
Administration and NATO leadership. One
of those constraints was a decision not to
use ground forces in the operation. As
General Richard Hawley, former
commander of Air Combat Command noted,
the inability of planners to use the joint
effects created by the coordinated use of
land and air forces in an operation was a
hindrance. "When you don't have that
synergy, things take longer and they're
harder ... "80 In hindsight, many believe that a
credible ground force would have forced the
Serbs to mass and maneuver in ways which
would have made them easier to find and
attack from the air.81 Despite this limitation,
one particular Allied Force engagement
underscored the incredible synergy that can
occur when ground maneuver units are
used to manipulate enemy fielded forces
into vulnerable air engagement zones.

On 26 May 1999, the KLA, a guerrilla force
operating in Kosovo which opposed the
Serbs, launched a massive offensive called
"Operation Arrow" involving 400 troops
against the Serbian forces in an attempt to
secure safe supply routes for their fighters.
Outgunned, these rebels quickly found
themselves on the defensive and were
pinned down by over 700 massed Serbian
troops. During these troop movements,
coalition sensor operators detected the
Serbian concentrations and Air Operations
Center personnel subsequently directed
unmanned aerial vehicles and fighter
aircraft to the area for reconnaissance and
attacks on these units.82

A few days later,on June 7th, the Serbs staged a massive
attack near the Kosovo-Albanian border
against these KLA troops using augmented
troop strength, exposing between 800 and
1200 personnel to airpower in the attempt to
overcome the guerilla fighters. As the KLA
enticed these forces out of hiding, the
JFACC directed a lethal air maneuver force
to the engagement zone, attacking the
fielded troops with two 8-52 and two 8-1
bombers using 86 blast fragmentation and
cluster bombs which crippled the Serbian
ground force. Remarkably, battlefield
reports indicated that after the engagement,
less than 50 percent of the Serbian troops
remained alive, and the Serbian offensive
was unquestionably halted. On that day,
the synergy created by just four aircraft
coupled with an enticing ground force
resulted in an overwhelming defeat of the
enemy. It was the heaviest coalition attack
against fielded forces in the campaign. 83

This unique engagement was the
essence of BAO. It did not represent CAS,
and it was not interdiction - it was something
in between. Air planners applied an air
maneuver force on the battlefield against a
fielded force, and soundly defeated it before
it was in a position to demand typical close
air support coordination. And most
importantly, they did so before the enemy
force was in a position to employ its own
deadly weapons against the land force.
Without airpower, the KLA guerillas would
have likely suffered crushing defeat.
Likewise, without the KLA's presence, the
JFACC would likely have been unable to
accomplish the task of rendering a
substantial opposition ground force combat
ineffective. Together, both achieved a
synergy that crushed the enemy on the
battlefield with minimal coalition losses.

Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Ground Force
Entices Basra Convoy

Years later during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, on 26 March 2003, a column of
between 70 and 120 armored vehicles,
under the expected cover of a heavy
sandstorm, moved out of the city of Basra.
Drawn by the presence of coalition ground
forces there, and with the intent to engage
British troops in surface warfare, this convoy
of troops and tanks streamed south, only to
find themselves suddenly targeted by a
massive assault from Harrier and Tornado
attack aircraft which effectively destroyed
them. 84 Unintentionally, coalition ground
forces enticed an Iraqi surface unit into a
BAO engagement zone with devastating
results. The implication in this case is that
planners, anticipating this kind of enemy
reaction, can position surface forces to fill
this role intentionally, exposing the enemy
to air attack. Ground units finish with an
offensive.

Iraqi Freedom - Destruction of the
Baghdad Republican Guard

A few days later, as Army and Marine
Corps forces moved swiftly north towards
Baghdad, the Iraqi regime redirected troops
towards them in an attempt to engage
coalition surface forces before they could
enter the city. As reported in the
Washington Post, "Columns of Iraq's elite
Republican Guard divisions and paramilitary
guerillas moved south from
Baghdad ... under the shroud of swirling
sandstorms in an apparent attempt to
challenge [coalition ground forces before
they were] able to mass enough force to
attack the capital. .. "85 Well prior to the
arrival of friendly troops, Lt Gen Moseley,
who was the JFACC during Operations Iraqi
Freedom, directed BAO against large
concentrations of the Republican Guard
arrayed in the region south of the city. "U.S.
commanders responded by ordering intense
air strikes, which they said wiped out much
of one convoy of several hundred vehicles
believed to be ferrying soldiers from the
Medina Division of the Republican Guard
toward forward elements of the U.S. Army's
3rd Infantry Division encamped near
Karbala, about 50 miles south of Baghdad,"
according to the Washington Post.86
Responding to questions from reporters
during a news conference after these
operations, Lt Gen Moseley remarked, "I
find it interesting when folks say we're
softening [the Republican Guard] up. We're
not softening them up, we're killing them."87
Echoing this, the New York Times
explained, "the Republican Guard's
resistance was so weak [because it had]
been a bull's-eye for American airpower for
days ... [it had a] devastating effect on Iraq's
forces in the field."88 Some U.S.
commanders, speaking with embedded
reporters, expressed surprise at the lack of
resistance that they saw as they rolled into
Baghdad.89 "People on TV kept asking,
'Where is the Republican Guard,' [said a
fighter pilot who flew 19 combat missions in
the war] 'I can tell you where they are:
Thetre blowed up. And we blew them
up." 0 In the final days, advancing coalition
troops enticed the movement of Iraqi forces
into a zone vulnerable to overwhelming
airpower, and the results were historic.

4. INTEGRATING BOTH BLADES
OF THE JOINT SCISSORS

Airmen have a unique mindset
regarding team warfare, and have long
· known the value of rapid role exchange
between supported and supporting combat
elements. During air combat maneuvering,
when two offensive fighter aircraft engage
an enemy, the pilot most capable of killing
the enemy, whether he is the flight leader or
the wingman, becomes the supported or
"engaged" fighter. As the fight progresses,
if the supporting fighter subsequently
becomes more capable of offensive action,
or if he becomes defensive, both aircraft
swap roles with a single radio call made
from the newly "engaged" fighter. This time tested
technique is key to air superiority,
and when properly applied, is a concept
which can also be instrumental in a joint
victory against surface forces. Acting alone,
each fighter is less capable, and odds of .
success are greatly reduced; however,
acting together, team combat produces
phenomenal synergy.

Although combat at the operational
level of war against an enemy fielded force
is by definition exceedingly more complex
than a simple air-to-air engagement, the
basic logic is strikingly similar. At the
operational level of war, when using an air
maneuver force coupled with a substantial
ground presence, the Joint Force
Commander has the ability to use both
"blades of the scissors" to defeat enemy
fielded forces on the surface. Using current
and developing C41SR capability, he can
choose which blade is "supported" based on
real-time conditions as they develop across
the battlespace. "Essentially, ground
maneuver should support air interdiction
when the initial conditions are favorable for
ground maneuver and potentially favorable
for interdiction ... when the prevailing
conditions weigh in favor of either side, then
that particular component should become
the supported force."91

To achieve victory against fielded
forces, the JFC can best use both the air
and land components as mutuallysupporting
blades, maximizing the
contributions of each to overwhelm enemy
forces with minimum risk. "Just as
maneuver and fires are fundamental
principles of tactical warfare, ground
maneuver and air interdiction can and
should be synchronized so that each
complements and reinforces the other at the
operational level of war"92

Effective C2 will
be the linchpin of this joint synchronization.
Depending upon the conditions unique to
each operation, planners may use air
intelligence and air C2, or air intelligence
with Army C2 from a Ground Liaison, or
some combination of both to kill the desired
targets.93 Together, forces and C2 from
mutually supporting components can bring
decisive effects to the battlefield. 94 ,

INITIATING WITH AIR AS THE
SUPPORTED COMPONENT

To win desired effects against fielded
forces, the JFC and his staff should
capitalize on the advantages of designating
air as the supported component for the
initial stages of the operation. This action
would comply with established doctrine, and
it just makes sense. As stated in the 2001
version of Joint Publication 3-0, "The
JFACC is the supported commander for the
JFC's overall air interdiction effort, while
land and naval component commanders are
supporting commanders for interdiction in
their [areas of operations]."95

In future combat against fielded
forces, the air component will initially
provide the majority of effective combat
power, due to the speed with which
airpower can reach global targets. During
crisis operations, the Air Force's developing
Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) CONOPS
may well enable the JFACC to tackle the
tyranny of distance long before large
numbers of surface forces are likely to
become available,96 making air the logical
supported compon·ent duririg early efforts
against enemy fielded units. As General
Hawley explains, "ground forces would play
an integral role in optimizing GSTF and seabased
strike capabilities. Light ground
forces and SOF, tightly integrated with all
elements of the sea and land based
aerospace force, would be employed to find
and fix mobile elements of the enemy force
for precision attack by B-2s, F-22s, and
carrier based aircraft. This is not to say that
land forces should not engage the enemy,
only that their primary objective in the GSTF
construct would be to expose the enemy to
attack by the aerospace elements of the
joint force, while avoiding contact."97

This initial preponderance of BAO
effects, as well as planning factors unique to
the air component, combined with surface
planners' general unfamiliarity with the
capabilities of an air maneuver force make
the air component the logical choice to be
the supported effort during the planning and
initial execution phases of this kind of joint
operation. According to Egginton, "ideally,
the JFACC supervises the orchestration of a
jointly devised and agreed upon general
scheme of maneuver aimed at promoting
[air] as the primary killing mechanism
without subjecting the ground force to
undue risk."98

At a pre-determined point in the
campaign, the land component would be reassigned
the supported function through a
smooth, planned role transition as the
operation morphs into a close fight. The
timing of this role exchange should be
based on the enemy's force strength and
effectiveness after being engaged by the air
maneuver force. When role exchange
occurs, the air component would shift to the
familiar CAS/lnterdiction missions as troops
move to contact.

Designating air as the initial
supported component will emphasize
coordination of joint three-dimensional
maneuver warfare because it will, by
default, force thorough, well-planned
integration of both land and air capabilities
into the operational planning effort. In
Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom's Operation
Anaconda demonstrated the unfortunate
outcome of a plan developed using poorly
planned integration of air component
capabilities. If Anaconda's planning efforts
indicate typical planning constructs, groundcentric
planners may not have the
background to apply coordination measures
required by BAO. Similarly, air planners will
likely possess a limited understanding of
ground operations. Therefore, because
both intend for the engagement to ultimately
resolve to a close fight, air and ground
planners will need to thoroughly coordinate
to identify desired engagement zones, direct
the manipulation of enemy forces, and to
pre-coordinate for a timely exchange of the
supported/supporting roles. In the future,
operations requiring Anaconda's hammerand-
anvil style of warfare could be fought
more efficiently using this construct by
designating the JFACC as the lead.

Designation of a supported air
component will allow the JFACC to
coordinate the concentration of BAO, thus
optimizing designated killboxes with
appropriate aircraft types. Furthermore, it
will reduce land component "CAS
Emergencies" and response times, because
the air component will coordinate the timing
and tempo of maneuver warfare, allowing it
to anticipate the role exchange and CAS
surge requirements. Just as in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, a supported air component
will reduce land component casualties
during an operation, because a majority of
enemy fielded forces can be destroyed,
Republican-Guard style, prior to friendly
force movement-to-contact.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPID ROLE
EXCHANGE

At a given point in the operation, joint
land maneuver forces will shift from a
manipulation mission to actively engage
enemy forces, demanding a transition of the
supported role to the land component.
Whether this happens early or well into the
operation will depend on the coercive ability
of the ground maneuver force to compel the
enemy towards the air component's desired
engagement zone. Under ideal
circumstances, if the ground maneuver
force is successful, the air component
reduces the enemy force strength
significantly, allowing ground maneuver
forces to achieve JFC objectives with
minimal casualties. Under worst-case
conditions, if the air component is unable to
conduct meaningful BAO against fielded
forces, its contributions would revert to the
traditional CAS and Interdiction roles.
Because of the dynamic nature of
this proposed style of operation, the speed,
simplicity, and clarity of the role reversal
between components must be a top
operational priority. Communication will be
crucial, and commanders at all levels of
organization must understand the plan in
order to achieve the desired effects. As
James Winnefeld observed, "the joint
commander's objective should be to
minimize the complexity while maximizing
the product of the joint force. "99

As a means to ensure simplicity and produce the
rapid exchange of supported/supporting
roles, the JFC could apply the Army's
"Battle Handover" doctrine.100
Fluid role exchange during joint
operations such as those described here
against fielded enemy units will demand a
measure of flexibility which is inherent in
airpower. Recent Army focus on digitization
and network-centric warfare, as well as
application of lessons learned during
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM may provide
the land component with the capability to
make rapid shifts on the surface, resulting in
quicker success. Simplicity and effective
command and control between all joint force
elements are crucial to victory in such
dynamic operations.

5. CONCLUSION

Warfare in recent years has
demonstrated how both land and air
components can be used synergistically to
produce dramatic effects on the battlefield.
While ground maneuver can influence an
enemy, either to push him away under
threat of defeat, or to entice him to fight,
this important capability becomes most
effective when combined with an air
maneuver force. What has emerged since
1990 is the potential ability for a joint
commander to intentionally manipulate an
enemy ground force into a zone vulnerable
to massed, concentrated airpower. In the
application of force against an army, the Air
Force's newest doctrinal construct, BAO,
offers the JFC a methodology that ushers in
a new era for joint operational planning.
BAO capitalizes on lessons learned during
operations in Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq, where enemy forces reacted to
friendly ground presence, only to be
subsequently hammered by airpower.

These operations have demonstrated that
using BAO in a campaign against fielded
forces, the JFC may best achieve his
operational objectives by designating the air
component the main effort, supported by
surface maneuver to drive or entice an
enemy into a vulnerable air attack zone,
then shift the supported role to the land
component as troops move to close contact.
Therefore, every effort should be made to
incorporate this BAO concept into Air Force
and joint doctrine, to enable the remarkable
lessons of recent warfare to impact future
operations.

Airmen today have a new vision of
joint warfare, a vision that seeks to leverage
the joint force's newly acquired airborne
sensor, C2, and precision capabilities with
Army and Marine maneuver to manipulate
the enemy on the battlefield, overwhelm him
with airpower, and then engage a muchweakened
opponent in the close fight. Such
a vision can only be realized through
realistic training which reinforces functional
integration of all services. Doing so will
ultimately benefit America with a truly joint
mindset that maximizes combat power at
the operational level of war while minimizing
the risk of friendly casualties. 101 BAO,
coupled with well planned and executed
ground maneuver has the potential to
provide a previously unexplored asymmetric
advantage to U.S. and coalition forces.


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Notes:
1 Keith B. Richburg and Susan B. Glasser, "Iraqi Tanks Try to Break Out of Basra, British Troops Bombard
City," The Washington Post, 27 March 2003, 1 · ·
2 Benjamin S, Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca New York: Cornell University
Press, 2000), 296
3 Terrance J. McCaffrey, Ill, What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development
From Pre-Desert Storm to 2001, (Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama School Of Advanced Airpower Studies,
Air University, June 2002), 116
4 AFDD 2-1.3, Counter/and Operations, August 1999,
5 Lt Col Gary Crowder, USAF ACC/XPS, interviewed by author, 1 April 2003.
6 Mccaffrey, 3
7 ibid., v
8 ibid., 3
9 ibid., 26
10 ibid., 35
11 Lt Col Peter S Palmer, Lt Col David J Scott, Lt Col John A Toolan, The Battle of Khafji An Assessment of
Airpower. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 14 April 1998), 3
12 Mccaffrey, 46
13 ibid., 48
14 ibid., 52
15 ibid., 54
16 ibid., 59
17 ibid., 59
18 McCaffrey, 2002, 102
19 ibid., 102
2° Crowder
21 ibid.
22 Mccaffrey, 104
18
23 Rowan Scarborough, "Rulers of the air," The Washington Times, on line, Internet, April 27, 2003, available
from https://www .washtimes.com/national/20030427-10772613.htm, 5
24 Robert Pape, Bombing To Win, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1996), 20
25 ibid., 69
26 Scarborough, 5
27 John A Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century," in THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER In
the Aftermath of the Gulf War ed. Richard H Shultz, Jr and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base,
AL: Air University Press, July 1992) 68
28 Mccaffrey, 1 O
29 General (Ret.) Richard E. Hawley, Hon Michael B Donley & John R Backschies
"Enhancing USAF's Pacific Posture, How the Air Force Can Transform to Support a New Joint Warfighting
Architecture", Armed Forces Journal International, September 2002, online, Internet, available
at:http://www.afji.com/afji/Mags/2002/Sept/USAF Pacific.html,
30 Martin Van Creveld, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Al: Air University Press,
July 1994 ), 204
31 Price T. Bingham, "Seeking Synergy Joint Effects-Based Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring
2002,53
32 ibid., 54
33 AFDD 2-1.3, Counter/and Operations, August 1999, 3
34 McCaffrey, 94
35 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, June 2001, 2-7.
36 Bingham, 56 ·
37 Mark Mazzetti, 'The battle for Baghdad begins: Marine and Army units advance through Republican Guard
Defenses," U.S. News and World Report, April 2, 2003, 1
38 Creve Id, 7
39 ibid, 9
40 ibid, 1 and 209
41 FM 3-0, 6-13
42 ibid, 7-6
43 AFDD 2-1. Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 4
44 Robert P. Givens, Turning the Vertical Flank, Air Power as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign,
iMaxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002), 84
5 ibid., 85
46 A.M. Gray, FM1 (US Marine Corps), Warfighting, 1994, 29
47 Givens, 84
48 Benjamin S, Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca New York: Cornell University
Press, 2000),283 (Quoting Jim Blaker, "The Owens Legacy," Armed Forces Journal International, July
1996, p21)
49 FM 3-0, page 6-13
50 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Lessons from the War in Kosovo," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2002, 17
51 COL John F. Antal, "Killing Snakes, Lessons Learned from the Fighting in Afghanistan," ARMY, June 2002,
14
52 Field Manual (FM) 3-31 MCWP 3-40.7 Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook 13 Dec 2001,
H-17
53 ibid., H-24
54 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, June 2001,7-7
55 ibid., 6-15 .
56 ibid., 7-9
57 ibid., 7-9
58 ibid., 7-7
59 ibid, 7-15
60 Dennis Steele, "Operation Anaconda, Taking the Fight to the Enemy in Afghanistan," Army, April 2002, 19
61 ANACONDA was a watershed event in the recent history of Joint operations. Despite examples of heroic
execution on the part of the soldiers and airmen who participated, it represents a missed opportunity in joint
19
operational planning and therefore is a valuable learning opportunity. Although it was successful overall, an
assessment of Anaconda's execution can provide insight into how much more effective this coalition
operation might have been had joint planners incorporated Battlefield Air Operations in a pre-planned,
integrated way.
62 Rebecca Grant, "The Airpower of Anaconda," Air Force Magazine, September 2002, 62
63 Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Troop Movement, How the Army ditched the Powell Doctrine,"
The New Republic, March 25, 2002, 23
64 Grant, 68
65 ibid, 63
Explaining why he didn't plan to use extensive airpower during the operation, Major General Hagenback, who
command~d Anaconda, explaiaed it was because of the rugged terrain, caves, and his perception that "air
campaigns are most effective against 'fixed' targets.(McElroy, 2002)
66 Steele, 19
Anaconda was hailed as the largest ground operation in the Afghanistan campaign of Operation Enduring
Freedom, and the largest combat air assault in 11 years.
67 Nevertheless, as Gen Franks reported, Afghan forces were able to move to contact with al Qaeda, and in
some cases actually served as blocking forces instead of driving the enemy forward. (Paul Haven, "Franks
calls Anaconda a "Success,"' Associated Press Online.International News (LexisNexis Academic Document)
on line, Internet, March 18, 2002, available from http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document, 1)
Eventually, the evading al Qaeda found their way into familiar prepared positions, which were pre-stocked
with munitions dispersed within a series of cave systems.67 Although coalition ground forces had effectively
manipulated the enemy, they found themselves up against a formidable array of defensive fighting positions
that made force-on-force combat a deadly alternative. Faced with a tough enemy, one US detachment that
had expected support from Afghan troops during a firefight, instead called in air to destroy a platoon-sized
element.(Grant, 66)
68 ibid., 67
69 As General Hagenbeck reported, "We caught several hundred of them heading with RPGs and mortars
toward the fight. .. we body slammed them."(Grant, 68)
70 ibid., 68
71 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in
the Gulf, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 370
72 ibid., 370 .
73 ibid., 417
74 ibid. ' 369
75 Lambeth, 2000, 121
76 Palmer, 7
77 Lambeth, 123
78 Palmer, 26
79 Gordon , 286
80 Lambeth, 2002, 17 (Quoting Bradley Graham, "General Says U.S. Readiness is Ailing ," The Washington
Post, April 30, 1999)
81 ibid., 17
82 Lambeth, 2000, 189
83 Lambeth, 2000, 190)
84 Keith B. Richburg and Susan B. Glasser, "Iraqi Tanks Try to Break Out of Basra, British Troops Bombard
. City," The Washington Post, 27 March 2003, 1
85 Peter Baker and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Republican Guard Units Move South From Baghdad Toward U.S.
Forces Big Convoy is Hit Hard By Airstrikes," The Washingon Post, 27 March 2003, 1
86 ibid.,, 1
87 Scarborough, 6
88 Michael R. Gordon, "A NATION AT WAR: STRATEGY; Goal of U.S.: Avoid a Seige," The New York
Times, April 3, 2003
89 Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, "Defense Department Operational Update Briefing," Federal
News Service, on line, Internet, April 3, 2003, available from http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe , 4
20
90 Gordon Trowbridge, "AIR POWER PAVES WAY, Leaders recount success, lessons learned from working
with ground units," Air Force Times, 28 April 2003, 8
91 Egginton, 32
92 Egginton, 9
93 Crowder
94 Recent developments in persistent sensor technology, command and control systems, and precision
munitions have dramatically increased the JFC's ability to prosecute debilitating attacks on enemy fielded
forces. Dramatic advances at Joint Forces Command with the Combined Relevant Operating Picture,
coupled with a defe11se-wide effort to synchronize the battle picture so that all commanders see, and act on,
the same information.(Falvo, 1) Fed by new, persistent tracking platforms and advanced C2 systems, this
convergence of multiple technologies portends an ever-increasing capability for the commander to monitor,
assess, and manipulate enemy formations in preparation for their violent destruction from the air. All
components will soon be. able to see the same picture, enabling unprecedented unity of effort.
95 JP 3-0, IV-13
96 Hawley, 2
97 ibid., 4
98 Egginton, 36
99 James A Winnefeld, and Dana J Johnson, Joint Air Operations Pursuit of Unity in command and Control
1942-1991 (Annapolis Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 164
100 Army Field Manual FM-114 describes Battle Handover as a simple, standardized, and coordinated
operation that transfers responsibility for fighting an enemy from one unit to another. According to Army FM-
114, clearly established procedures "preclude a loss of momentum in the attack ... in the conduct of air and
ground operations, the air and ground troop commanders often pass an enemy force in contact to
another. .. Battle Handover governs this process ... "(FM-114, 3-189)
101 Lambeth, 2000, 315
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24


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