Major General Jochen Both (German Luftwaffe) and I wrote this article in an effort to encourage ISAF nations to consider additional airpower contributions for Afghanistan.
Airpower, used to its full potential, is a vital element of NATO’s effort in Afghanistan. ISAF’s campaign design is based on a significant uplift of troops, coupled with an increased level of partnering between Coalition and AFG Security forces, spread widely across Key Terrain Districts throughout four Regional Commands. It is generally accepted that this design will consequently lead to an increasing operational tempo with higher intensity of offensive operations across the ISAF Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) as greater insurgent interaction causes corresponding upturns in violence in contested areas. Within this Counter Insurgency Fight (COIN) fight, the Air Component significantly will contribute to ISAF’s mission in a fully integrated role across all lines of operation.
Accordingly, over the coming months an increasing number of higher prioritized Joint Tactical Air Support Requests (JTARS) across Afghanistan in direct support of the Ground Force Commander’s scheme of maneuver can be expected, resulting in a higher demand for Close Air Support (CAS) missions.
CAS is the utilization of fixed-wing combat aircraft to provide timely, adaptable and effects-based assistance to friendly troops. CAS is most effective in a COIN environment through early integration into a Regional Commander’s and/or Task Force Commander’s operational design when used to maintain and/or re-gain the commander’s initiative. During situations when friendly troops experience enemy fire , CAS is often the only means available to provide for their protection and frequently provides urgently-needed tactical opportunities for successful disengagement. Historically in Afghanistan, the arrival of Fixed-Wing CAS aircraft overhead during insurgent attacks on ISAF has distracted the enemy from conducting offensive fires while allowing friendly forces to regain the initiative. Most importantly, CAS aircraft have provided critical effects for ground forces on patrol simply through presence. Without firing a shot, the visible support of CAS overhead has often prevented the escalation of hostilities and protected forces on the ground by demonstrating the tangible threat of force.
CAS aircrews have helped save the lives of countless ISAF ground forces. As useful as CAS aircraft have become throughout Afghanistan, however, increases in troop force levels this summer may cause commanders to face operations across the CJOA with a partnered but nevertheless overstretched Combined Team on the Regional and Task Force levels. Analysis conducted recently indicates a need for increased numbers of CAS aircraft in Afghanistan to support the force uplift occurring summer 2010. This analysis contrasts sharply, however, with the fact that ISAF’s number of available CAS aircraft falls short of SHAPE’s vetted and approved requirements for CAS platforms, even when considering additional US Air Force contributions expected this summer.
During COIN operations, the use of kinetics, while sometimes necessary, is best avoided. The requirement to apply the Commander’s guidance to protect the people during all phases of operations across the CJOA requires a strategic appreciation of challenges and atmospherics in COIN during all kinetic and non-kinetic activity, and leads to COMISAF’s ultimate axiom: Avoid civilian casualties while protecting the people. While advantages of Attack Helicopter / Close Combat Attack (CCA) lie predominantly in the tactical, kinetic environment, Fixed Wing CAS aircraft can range the full extent of Afghanistan to provide non-kinetic armed overwatch, and deliver precision fires when necessary to defuse hostilities with a tailorable response for the ground commander.
CAS provides a remarkably flexible force-multiplier in the COIN realm. Often, the very presence of airpower stabilizes the environment and facilitates ISAF’s population-centered maneuver.
Over the past year, airmen in Afghanistan flying in the CAS role have demonstrated exceptional discipline, restraint, and precision, which have been learned over years of development as part of the ISAF counterinsurgency effort. A combination of weekly tactics conferences, distributed Rules Of Engagement tests, and CAS scenario training produce an immensely professional air team. In fact, some of these air ‘best practices’ are now being exported throughout the theater as ground forces grapple with the complexities of the insurgency.
Across Afghanistan today, Fixed Wing CAS aircrews work together along with Close Combat Attack counterparts to provide continuous support to troops on patrol. Unlike attack helicopters, however, which are limited in speed, range, munitions, and altitude – and more vulnerable to surface-to-air fires due to their operating environment, Fixed Wing aircraft bring a greater range of air effects and non-traditional ISR capabilities across the Afghanistan area of operations. In full appreciation of the COIN environment it is important to highlight that the employment of Fixed Wing CAS follows the air component’s important philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution. This inherent close coordination with ground commanders during kinetic employment functions as a system of checks and balances. Where rotary aviation is often employed as an extension of “direct fire,” it lacks the positive control of the CAS approval process during kinetic engagements. In COIN, that extra level of stringent control enables the most disciplined execution across a full range of capabilities.
Fighter aircraft such as the Strike Eagle or the Tornado – not as threatened by insurgent offensive operations - have the freedom and speed to reach points throughout the battle space quickly, which is a key element of airpower’s inherent combat flexibility. The range across the CJOA, the speed of response to remote locations, the versatility and ubiquity as well as the ability to appear and disappear rapidly and with little warning are strategic advantages. Of similar importance is the adaptability of CAS assets in order to shape tactical situations by delivering the desired effects for the Ground Commander. Fixed Wing CAS can provide in one mission a variety of escalation of force measures- from Shows of Presence, Shows of Force, and supersonic passes, to the use of deadly force with a variety of weapons ranging from the gun and low collateral damage weapons to the largest precision-guided weapons. In summary, CAS aircraft are theater assets which provide commanders with essential, asymmetric strengths in the COIN fight.
Today in Afghanistan, fast aircraft are routinely used to support planned operations. While they provide daily armed overwatch for troops on patrol during ISAF’s highest-priority taskings in support of COMISAF’s focus areas, they remain ‘on call’ for urgent re-tasking in support of troops taking enemy fire anywhere in the country. When the calls do come, these planes are immediately dispatched from their routine patrol missions to support firefights throughout Afghanistan. ISAF troops in the north and west face the greatest response times, waiting longer than in other regions for CAS-capable jets to arrive overhead.
Because the number of CAS assets is limited, a limited percentage of ground commander’s air requests are supported, but when troops begin taking enemy fire, that number is reduced as fighters are re-missioned for extremis support. Unfortunately, available data indicates that as force levels increase throughout the summer, the aircraft to support them will diminish on a per capita basis, resulting in longer response times for ISAF forces under fire.
Despite the demonstrated usefulness of CAS aircraft which can quickly range the full extent of Afghanistan, political constraints on troop employment and the physical realities of limited ramp space in country both limit the application of CAS to aircraft currently planned for Afghanistan. Put simply, contributing nations have supplied their maximum number of forces (including aircrew and maintenance personnel), which will politically restrict the amount of additional airpower which can be sent to theater. Furthermore, the amount of physical ramp space available at fighter-capable bases has become tightly congested.
These two constraints taken together should persuade each nation to look carefully at what it can further contribute to ISAF’s COIN effort with respect to CAS airpower, in order to maximize each nation’s contribution to the ISAF mission. The roles all ISAF aircraft currently fill in theater should be reconsidered carefully, to ensure they are utilized to their maximum extent. In accordance with their specific capabilities, allowing increased numbers of ISAF aircraft to augment existing CAS assets through additional involvement in CAS activities could significantly improve the success of ISAF’s COIN campaign. This subtle but potentially game-changing improvement would significantly strengthen ISAF’s effectiveness across Afghanistan and provide an improved level of troop support to defuse enemy hostilities, while increasing the utility of FW assets across the theater. Providing and enabling more participating aircraft to deliver low-altitude shows of force, precision strafe, and deliveries of precision-guided munitions in support of troops under attack could generate immense gains for troops from all ISAF-contributing nations.
Major General Jochen Both (DEU Luftwaffe)
Col James Jinnette (USAF)
Return to Three Capes Website
Airpower, used to its full potential, is a vital element of NATO’s effort in Afghanistan. ISAF’s campaign design is based on a significant uplift of troops, coupled with an increased level of partnering between Coalition and AFG Security forces, spread widely across Key Terrain Districts throughout four Regional Commands. It is generally accepted that this design will consequently lead to an increasing operational tempo with higher intensity of offensive operations across the ISAF Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) as greater insurgent interaction causes corresponding upturns in violence in contested areas. Within this Counter Insurgency Fight (COIN) fight, the Air Component significantly will contribute to ISAF’s mission in a fully integrated role across all lines of operation.Accordingly, over the coming months an increasing number of higher prioritized Joint Tactical Air Support Requests (JTARS) across Afghanistan in direct support of the Ground Force Commander’s scheme of maneuver can be expected, resulting in a higher demand for Close Air Support (CAS) missions.
CAS is the utilization of fixed-wing combat aircraft to provide timely, adaptable and effects-based assistance to friendly troops. CAS is most effective in a COIN environment through early integration into a Regional Commander’s and/or Task Force Commander’s operational design when used to maintain and/or re-gain the commander’s initiative. During situations when friendly troops experience enemy fire , CAS is often the only means available to provide for their protection and frequently provides urgently-needed tactical opportunities for successful disengagement. Historically in Afghanistan, the arrival of Fixed-Wing CAS aircraft overhead during insurgent attacks on ISAF has distracted the enemy from conducting offensive fires while allowing friendly forces to regain the initiative. Most importantly, CAS aircraft have provided critical effects for ground forces on patrol simply through presence. Without firing a shot, the visible support of CAS overhead has often prevented the escalation of hostilities and protected forces on the ground by demonstrating the tangible threat of force.
CAS aircrews have helped save the lives of countless ISAF ground forces. As useful as CAS aircraft have become throughout Afghanistan, however, increases in troop force levels this summer may cause commanders to face operations across the CJOA with a partnered but nevertheless overstretched Combined Team on the Regional and Task Force levels. Analysis conducted recently indicates a need for increased numbers of CAS aircraft in Afghanistan to support the force uplift occurring summer 2010. This analysis contrasts sharply, however, with the fact that ISAF’s number of available CAS aircraft falls short of SHAPE’s vetted and approved requirements for CAS platforms, even when considering additional US Air Force contributions expected this summer. During COIN operations, the use of kinetics, while sometimes necessary, is best avoided. The requirement to apply the Commander’s guidance to protect the people during all phases of operations across the CJOA requires a strategic appreciation of challenges and atmospherics in COIN during all kinetic and non-kinetic activity, and leads to COMISAF’s ultimate axiom: Avoid civilian casualties while protecting the people. While advantages of Attack Helicopter / Close Combat Attack (CCA) lie predominantly in the tactical, kinetic environment, Fixed Wing CAS aircraft can range the full extent of Afghanistan to provide non-kinetic armed overwatch, and deliver precision fires when necessary to defuse hostilities with a tailorable response for the ground commander.
CAS provides a remarkably flexible force-multiplier in the COIN realm. Often, the very presence of airpower stabilizes the environment and facilitates ISAF’s population-centered maneuver. Over the past year, airmen in Afghanistan flying in the CAS role have demonstrated exceptional discipline, restraint, and precision, which have been learned over years of development as part of the ISAF counterinsurgency effort. A combination of weekly tactics conferences, distributed Rules Of Engagement tests, and CAS scenario training produce an immensely professional air team. In fact, some of these air ‘best practices’ are now being exported throughout the theater as ground forces grapple with the complexities of the insurgency.
Across Afghanistan today, Fixed Wing CAS aircrews work together along with Close Combat Attack counterparts to provide continuous support to troops on patrol. Unlike attack helicopters, however, which are limited in speed, range, munitions, and altitude – and more vulnerable to surface-to-air fires due to their operating environment, Fixed Wing aircraft bring a greater range of air effects and non-traditional ISR capabilities across the Afghanistan area of operations. In full appreciation of the COIN environment it is important to highlight that the employment of Fixed Wing CAS follows the air component’s important philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution. This inherent close coordination with ground commanders during kinetic employment functions as a system of checks and balances. Where rotary aviation is often employed as an extension of “direct fire,” it lacks the positive control of the CAS approval process during kinetic engagements. In COIN, that extra level of stringent control enables the most disciplined execution across a full range of capabilities.
Fighter aircraft such as the Strike Eagle or the Tornado – not as threatened by insurgent offensive operations - have the freedom and speed to reach points throughout the battle space quickly, which is a key element of airpower’s inherent combat flexibility. The range across the CJOA, the speed of response to remote locations, the versatility and ubiquity as well as the ability to appear and disappear rapidly and with little warning are strategic advantages. Of similar importance is the adaptability of CAS assets in order to shape tactical situations by delivering the desired effects for the Ground Commander. Fixed Wing CAS can provide in one mission a variety of escalation of force measures- from Shows of Presence, Shows of Force, and supersonic passes, to the use of deadly force with a variety of weapons ranging from the gun and low collateral damage weapons to the largest precision-guided weapons. In summary, CAS aircraft are theater assets which provide commanders with essential, asymmetric strengths in the COIN fight.
Today in Afghanistan, fast aircraft are routinely used to support planned operations. While they provide daily armed overwatch for troops on patrol during ISAF’s highest-priority taskings in support of COMISAF’s focus areas, they remain ‘on call’ for urgent re-tasking in support of troops taking enemy fire anywhere in the country. When the calls do come, these planes are immediately dispatched from their routine patrol missions to support firefights throughout Afghanistan. ISAF troops in the north and west face the greatest response times, waiting longer than in other regions for CAS-capable jets to arrive overhead.
Because the number of CAS assets is limited, a limited percentage of ground commander’s air requests are supported, but when troops begin taking enemy fire, that number is reduced as fighters are re-missioned for extremis support. Unfortunately, available data indicates that as force levels increase throughout the summer, the aircraft to support them will diminish on a per capita basis, resulting in longer response times for ISAF forces under fire.
Despite the demonstrated usefulness of CAS aircraft which can quickly range the full extent of Afghanistan, political constraints on troop employment and the physical realities of limited ramp space in country both limit the application of CAS to aircraft currently planned for Afghanistan. Put simply, contributing nations have supplied their maximum number of forces (including aircrew and maintenance personnel), which will politically restrict the amount of additional airpower which can be sent to theater. Furthermore, the amount of physical ramp space available at fighter-capable bases has become tightly congested.
These two constraints taken together should persuade each nation to look carefully at what it can further contribute to ISAF’s COIN effort with respect to CAS airpower, in order to maximize each nation’s contribution to the ISAF mission. The roles all ISAF aircraft currently fill in theater should be reconsidered carefully, to ensure they are utilized to their maximum extent. In accordance with their specific capabilities, allowing increased numbers of ISAF aircraft to augment existing CAS assets through additional involvement in CAS activities could significantly improve the success of ISAF’s COIN campaign. This subtle but potentially game-changing improvement would significantly strengthen ISAF’s effectiveness across Afghanistan and provide an improved level of troop support to defuse enemy hostilities, while increasing the utility of FW assets across the theater. Providing and enabling more participating aircraft to deliver low-altitude shows of force, precision strafe, and deliveries of precision-guided munitions in support of troops under attack could generate immense gains for troops from all ISAF-contributing nations. Major General Jochen Both (DEU Luftwaffe)
Col James Jinnette (USAF)
Return to Three Capes Website
No comments:
Post a Comment